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Two months after the first cases of COVID-19 were detected in Wuhan, China, state 
governments faced the threat of an unprecedented public health emergency caused by an unknown 
pathogen, and uncertainty about the efficacy of containment measures.1 After the WHO announced 
that COVID-19 had become a pandemic, the Trump Administration declared a National 
Emergency and issued a travel ban on March 13, 2020.2 Subsequently, counties in New York and 
Washington began issuing stay-at-home orders, followed by California’s state wide order.3 
Governors began issuing executive orders to combat rising infection rates and an alarming number 
of outbreaks, with increasingly severe restrictions imposed as more data emerged about 
transmission.4 By May 2020, most states had issued emergency orders ranging from travel bans, 
to stay-at-home orders, to wide-spread school and business closures.5 Deriving authority from state 
emergency management and public health statutes, governors have relied heavily on executive 
orders and emergency declarations to contain the spread of the virus. 
As the pandemic persists, both private parties and state legislators have become 
increasingly hostile to the prolonged use and renewal of general emergency powers. The long-term 
nature of many of these executive orders has led to controversies about the extent to which 
governors can act unilaterally to mandate public health measures and restrict personal freedoms, 
and legal challenges have been inundating the courts for over a year. These claims have ranged 
from First, Second, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, to state constitutional claims alleging 
separation of powers violations and facially invalid emergency management statutes. Critics of 
state government action have also initiated legislative reforms that seek to fortify separation of 
powers doctrine and increase legislative oversight of gubernatorial authority.  
*** 
This paper focuses specifically on challenges to the exercise of executive power (1) where state 
constitutions do not specify the scope of executive powers or define legislative checks during a 
public health emergency; (2) where state disaster management statutes do not indicate whether a 
“disaster” includes a public health emergency or pandemic; and (3) where state governors face 
politicized resistance to their emergency authority and attacks from their own legislators. In 
looking at the implications of these challenges, this paper does not suggest that judicial review of 
executive power should be limited or suspended during a public health emergency. Nor does it 
1 A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, American Journal of Managed Care (Jan. 1, 2021) 
https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020 (Last accessed Mar. 28, 2021). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, State COVID-19 Emergency Orders, https://www.nga.org/state-covid-19-
emergency-orders/ (last visited December 30, 2020).  
5NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes (Aug. 8, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.aspx (last visited December 18, 2020); 
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, COVID-19 Resources for State Leaders: Executive Orders, 
https://web.csg.org/covid19/executive-orders/ (last visited January 5, 2021). 
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suggest that amending statutory frameworks for emergency response is an inherent threat to 
executive authority. 
 Instead, it explores opportunities to strengthen current constitutional and statutory 
frameworks and prevent the over-politicization of future public health response. I consider the 
historical trend of politicizing and leveraging a crisis to push an ideological agenda with much 
broader implications than the public health emergency at stake. The trend demonstrates that 
reactionary, politicized backlash often displaces preventative reform, which should take place after 
a crisis subsides to improve public health governance for the next crisis. This analysis of legal 
challenges and legislative reform, through a lens of partisanship and politicization, presents a way 
to look beyond the current political moment and explore how states can maintain an effective 
balance of power, while also making public health policy less susceptible to politicization. 
 
Part I provides an overview of the constitutional and statutory frameworks that define executive 
powers during disasters and highlights emergency management and public health laws that have 
generated legal controversies and legislative reforms across the country. 
 
Part II analyzes efforts to curtail executive emergency powers through the courts and legislatures, 
as well as shifting standards of judicial review that may impact deference granted to state 
governments during public health emergencies.   
 
Part III investigates the hyper-politicized response to executive action during the COVID-19 
pandemic, and the historical roots of partisan or ideological backlash during public health 
emergencies, and the implications of the political moment on future public health policy.  
 
Part IV explores strategies for mitigating public health risks that arise as a result of the 
politicization of crisis, and opportunities to create more effective governance structures based on 
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PART I: THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BASIS OF EXECUTIVE 
AUTHORITY DURING PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
 
“In preservation of the people's inherent right to liberty, the Framers of the United 
States Constitution devised a system of separate and distinct powers among the 
three branches of government… [and] the concentration of governmental power 
presented an extraordinary threat to individual liberty: 'The accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a 
few, or many, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.'”6 
 
State constitutions have evolved significantly over the past 200 years. Just as the federal 
Constitution emphasizes the importance of the three branches of government and maintaining a 
separation of powers, modern-day state constitutions have all embraced a separation of powers 
doctrine in some form. These provisions often favor the legislature in terms of balance of power, 
reflecting historical fears of monarchy and a single, consolidated power.7 However, emergency 
powers are one area where governors have been granted substantial, temporary powers, with 
varying degrees of legislative checks beyond the separation that is constitutionally mandated. 
Many lawsuits challenging abuse of executive authority during COVID-19 have alleged separation 
of powers violations, as well as violations of the non-delegation doctrine. 
 
A. The Statutory Basis of Executive Emergency Authority 
All states have some variation of an emergency or disaster declaration act,8 many of which 
were drafted in the 1950s in response to the Cold War and the need for local civil defense.9 Within 
this context, disaster management statutes included provisions on commandeering property, 
suspending the sale and distribution of certain goods, appropriating funds for disaster relief, and 
allowing the executive to suspend certain rules and regulations to allow for rapid military 
response.10 Subsequently, some states amended their statutes after the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency was established in 1979, and later added specific nuclear attack provisions.11 
After September 11th, many states also incorporated specific provisions related to the threat of 
 
6 Fabick v. Evers, No. 2020AP1718-OA, WL 1201478 **11 (Wis. March 31, 2021) (Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) 
(quoting The Federalist No. 47, at 298 (James Madison)). 
7 Daniel B. Rodriguez, Public Health Emergencies and State Constitutional Quality, RUT. U. L. REV. 1238 (2020). 
8 THE NETWORK FOR PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, Emergency Declaration Authorities Across All States (June 16, 2015) 
https://www.networkforphl.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Emergency-Declaration-Authorities.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2021). 
9 The Historical Context of Emergency Management, at 3. 
https://booksite.elsevier.com/samplechapters/9780750685146/02~Chapter_1.pdf 
10 Benjamin Della Rocca, Samantha Fry, Masha Simonova, Jacques Singer-Emery, State Emergency Authorities to 
Address COVID-19, Lawfare Blog (May 4, 2020) https://www.lawfareblog.com/state-emergency-authorities-
address-covid-19#Massachusetts. 
11 The Historical Context of Emergency Management, 7 (Last Accessed Mar. 15, 2021) 
https://booksite.elsevier.com/samplechapters/9780750685146/02~Chapter_1.pdf; 
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/dis_courses/us_response/resources/disaster_legislation_timeline.pdf. 
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terrorism.12 Powers granted in these statutes reflect a wide range of potential disasters and varying 
levels of authority to suspend or modify existing laws and procedures. Depending on the state, 
these include the power to (1) declare an emergency and issue emergency orders; (2) rescind, 
amend, or suspend regulations, statutes, and rules as necessary to contain the disaster; and (3) 
appropriate funds.13  
While there are legislative reforms pending in over 30 states, at the beginning of the 
pandemic, only six states had explicit legislative checks on the governor’s ability to issue executive 
orders,14 while 24 states required a legislative joint resolution to extend an order.15 Thirteen states 
were silent as to whether the legislature could terminate a declaration or executive order.16 Most 
of these emergency statutes were not designed to account for the particularities of public health 
emergencies, and vague statutory definitions have created uncertainty about whether pandemics 
constitute a “disaster” or “emergency.” Many of these acts emphasize “public safety,” but may not 
explicitly mention public health, natural-born diseases, or pandemics; those that do include public 
health emergencies rarely define what they entail.17  
To supplement general disaster laws, 35 states have codified public health emergency acts 
that designate powers during a public health crisis.18 During the COVID-19 pandemic, many 
governors issued executive orders pursuant to both their emergency management laws as well as 
public health emergency powers, while others acted solely under general emergency management 
authority. Although governors have invoked emergency powers for public health emergencies in 
the last few decades to respond to Ebola and H1N1, among others, the COVID-19 pandemic has 
highlighted the ambiguity in state law surrounding unilateral action and legislative oversight, 
which has become the source of many challenges to gubernatorial authority. Variations in state 
statutory frameworks for emergency response are highlighted below, with a particular focus on 
states where governors have faced legal challenges to their use of executive power.  
12 Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness: A Return to the Rule of Law, 
1 DREXEL L. REV. 341, 343 (2009). 
13 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, The Book of States 2019, 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/4.5.2019.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2020). 
14 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Legislative Oversight of Executive Orders (Jan 8, 2021) 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-oversight-of-executive-orders.aspx (last visited Jan 
12, 2021). 
15 Nicholas Birdsong, Balancing Legislative and Executive Powers in Emergencies, 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 28 LegisBrief (July 2020) 
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/legisbriefs/2020/JulyLBs/Executive-Powers-in-Emergencies25.pdf. 
16 Id. 
17 Evan D. Anderson and James G. Hodge, Emergency Legal Preparedness Among Select US Local Governments, 
Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness (2009) https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19797962/ (last visited Oct. 
29,2020). 
18THE NETWORK FOR PUBLIC HEALTH LAW, Emergency Declaration Authorities Across All States (June 16, 2015) 
https://www.networkforphl.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Emergency-Declaration-Authorities.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2021); Lainie Rutkow, An analysis of state public health emergency declarations, 104 (9) AM. J. PUB. 1601-5 
(2014) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4151908/. 




In Massachusetts, Governor Baker’s original executive order19 cited both the Civil Defense 
Act of 1950 (CDA) and MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 17, § 2A (public health emergency) to assert the 
governor’s authority over the sale of food and goods and the power to mandate quarantines. The 
CDA lists dozens of disasters for which executive emergency functions can be deployed, including 
enemy attack, nuclear radiation exposure, and natural disasters. It also includes disasters that 
“endanger[] the health, safety, or property of people,” but does not explicitly mention public health 
or pandemic.20 Massachusetts is one of the states that also has a public health emergency statute, 
which grants the public health commissioner certain powers in the event that the governor declares 
an emergency impacting public health.21 The commissioner’s powers are limited to enacting 
procedures that would ensure the continuation and enforcement of essential public health 
services.22 The Department of Public Health also has general powers over vaccination and 
inoculation schemes, as well as medical supply distribution. However, the commissioner must seek 
approval from the Governor and the Public Health Council. Neither the CDA nor the Public Health 
Emergency Act include a provision that allows for legislative veto power or termination of an 
order by joint resolution.23  
 
Michigan 
Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer declared the state’s first COVID-related emergency 
pursuant to two statutes: the Emergency Management Act (EMA) of 1976 and the Emergency 
Powers of the Governor Act (EPGA) of 1945. Unlike Massachusetts, the EMA’s definition of 
“disaster” includes epidemics and imposes a durational limit to a declared disaster.24 After 28 days, 
the Governor is required to terminate the disaster through executive order or proclamation unless 
she receives explicit permission to extend it through legislative joint resolution.25 The EPGA 
provides a broader definition of disaster: “in times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, 
catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state, or reasonable apprehension of immediate 
danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled.”26 After proclaiming 
a disaster under the EPGA, the governor “may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations 
 
19 MASS. EXEC. ORDER NO. 591: Declaration of a State of Emergency to Respond to COVID-19 (Mar. 10, 2020); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 639, § 5; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.17, § 2A. 
20 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 639, § 5. 
21 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.17, § 2A. 
22 Id. 
23 See also Kentucky statutory framework: Similarly, Kentucky does not specify a means for the legislature to 
terminate a state of emergency through joint resolution. However, the Kentucky Senate passed a law in early 2020 
that allows the General Assembly to terminate a state of emergency if the Governor has not already done so “before 
the first day of the next regular session of the General Assembly. (S.B. 150, Legis Sess. (K.Y. 2020)). Kentucky also 
provides a more specific list of disasters covered by the statute, including “all major hazards…mass-casualty or 
mass-fatality emergencies; other…biological….hazards; or other disaster or emergency occurrences; or catastrophe; 
or other causes;…and in order to protect life and property of the people of the Commonwealth, and to protect public 
peace, health, safety, and welfare.”(KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.100). 
24 MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 30.403. 
25 MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 30.403. 
26 MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 10.31(1)(1). 
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as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property.”27 A public health state of emergency 
under this act lasts for up to 60 days, renewable for an additional 30 days through legislative 
resolution.28  
Pennsylvania 
In Pennsylvania, Governor Tom Wolf issued the state’s first disaster declaration during the 
pandemic on March 6, 2020, pursuant to his powers under the Emergency Management Services 
Code (EMSC).29 A state of disaster or emergency can last for up to 90 days unless it is renewed 
by the Governor, and the General Assembly has the power to terminate the declaration through 
concurrent resolution.30 The statute also grants the Governor power to suspend provisions of 
regulatory statutes, orders, or rules if “strict compliance….would in any way prevent, hinder, or 
delay necessary action in coping with the emergency.”31 Pennsylvania also has a Public Health 
Emergency Measures statute, which applies: “In the case of an actual or suspected outbreak of a 
contagious disease or epidemic due to an actual or suspected bioterrorist or biohazardous event.”32 
The powers granted to the Governor in consultation with the Secretary of Health are limited to 
isolation and quarantine orders.  
Wisconsin 
Governor Tony Evers issued three emergency declarations pursuant to Wisconsin’s general 
emergency management statute, which allows for a 60-day state of emergency and does not 
explicitly require legislative approval to extend the order.33 Under Wisconsin law, “disaster" 
includes a “severe or prolonged, natural or human-caused, occurrence that threatens or negatively 
impacts life, health, property, infrastructure, the environment, the security of this state or a portion 
of this state…”34 The statute includes reference to public health emergencies, which are classified 
by “the occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition.35 Wisconsin also codifies 
the public health department’s authority to respond to emergency, granting extremely broad 
powers that include the ability to close schools and ban public gatherings, as well as create and 
enforce rules and orders necessary to respond to the emergency.36  
27 Id. 
28 MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 10.125(5). 
29 PA. EXEC. ORDER: Proclamation of Disaster Emergency, (Mar. 6, 2020). 
30 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301 (a)(c). 
31 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)(1). 
32 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2140.301. 
33 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 323.10. 
34 WIS. STAT. ANN. ch.323 § 02(6). 
35 The statute includes a number of stipulations, and emergency must meet all of the following criteria: “(a) Is 
believed to be caused by bioterrorism or a novel or previously controlled or eradicated biological agent; (b) Poses a 
high probability of any of the following: 1. A large number of deaths or serious or long-term disabilities among 
humans. 2. A high probability of widespread exposure to a biological, chemical, or radiological agent that creates a 
significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of people.” 
36 The public health department may: “promulgate and enforce rules or issue orders for guarding against the 
introduction of any communicable disease into the state, for the control and suppression of communicable diseases, 
for the quarantine and disinfection of persons, localities and things infected or suspected of being infected by a 
communicable disease and for the sanitary care of jails, state prisons, mental health institutions, schools, and public 





These four states exemplify common variations in state emergency management statutes. 
For example, Governors Baker and Whitmer invoked both general emergency management 
statutes as well as public health statutes as the basis of their authority. However, Massachusetts 
does not specify whether there is legislative authority to modify or terminate an executive order, 
whereas Michigan requires a joint resolution to extend a declaration under either statute. There is 
also a wide range of durational limits on an emergency: from Massachusetts, where there is no 
specified duration, to Pennsylvania’s 90-day limit, to Michigan, where the Governor must 
terminate her own emergency after only 28-days. 
The Pennsylvania public health law narrowly construes the governor’s authority to act in 
an emergency and specifies that the authority extends only to isolation and quarantine mandates. 
Similarly, the Massachusetts public health law limits the public health commissioner’s powers to 
ensuring that regular public health services continue to operate during the emergency. In 
comparison, Wisconsin explicitly grants powers to its public health department that extend well-
beyond quarantine. In terms of explicit reference to pandemics, Wisconsin includes public health 
emergencies as a disaster covered by the general emergency law, and Michigan’s Emergency 
Management Act mentions “epidemics.” In states where the law distinguishes between natural and 
human-made disasters, including Michigan and Massachusetts, it is unclear if “natural” disasters 
cover infectious diseases.   
The inclusion or absence of statutory provisions have paved the way for numerous legal 
challenges rooted in separation of powers doctrine and abuse of authority. These provisions 
include the governor’s power to create, amend, or rescind rules or regulations; the legislature’s 
power to override emergency declarations; the statutory definition of disaster; and specific 
parameters (duration, degree, and scope) placed on executive powers.  
 
 
PART II: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM TO CURTAIL 
EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY POWERS 
 
Governors are facing significant challenges to their powers due to the prolonged nature of 
the pandemic and lack of specificity in state constitutions and emergency laws. COVID-19 has 
lasted far longer than other public health crises in recent memory, such as the H1N1 epidemic or 
Ebola.37 Those emergencies raised controversies over the constitutionality of quarantine, as well 
as H1N1 vaccine rollouts—neither of which had long-term, sweeping economic impacts, nor did 
they trigger large numbers of legal challenges that impacted states or business sectors. This has 
not been the case during the COVID-19 pandemic, where governors have contended with a much 
 
buildings and connected premises. Any rule or order may be made applicable to the whole or any specified part of 
the state…[and] may authorize and implement all emergency measures necessary to control communicable 
diseases.” WIS. STAT. ANN. ch. 252, § 02. 
37 Melissa Markey, Montrece M. Ransom, and Gregory Sunshine, Ebola: A Public Health and Legal Perspective, 
24(2) MICH. STATE. INT. L. REV. 433-447. 
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wider range of unprecedented restrictions to combat the virus and have faced similarly broad legal 
challenges. The following section focuses on judicial review of state action, and specific cases 
where governors have faced constitutional and statutory challenges to their executive authority. 
 
A. Judicial Review During Public Health Emergencies: Jacobson v. 
Commonwealth 
Throughout the last century, courts have relied on the standard of judicial review outlined 
in Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which weighs the public good with protection 
for individual liberties during a public health emergency. In upholding a mandatory vaccination 
requirement during the smallpox epidemic, the Jacobson court held that executive orders during a 
public health crisis must “have a ‘real or substantial relation’ to the crisis and…must not represent 
‘plain, palpable’ invasions of clearly protected rights.”38 Although Jacobson was decided prior to 
modern tiers of judicial scrutiny, Justice Harlan’s opinion stressed that the state should be able to 
take actions that are generally reasonable and reflect the urgency required during public health 
emergencies.39 “In every well-ordered society… the rights of the individual in respect to his liberty 
may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by 
reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand.”40 Justice Harlan also 
emphasized that reasonableness and the non-arbitrary nature of executive or legislative action 
should be considered in the context of the public health emergency, and noted that state police 
powers should rely on recommendations from boards of health to inform their prevention 
strategies.41  
Although Jacobson challenged a mandatory vaccination scheme on Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds, courts have applied its precedent in a wide range of cases.42 During the 
COVID-19 pandemic in particular, Justice Harlan’s opinion has been interpreted in a variety of 
ways.43 While uncertainty remained about the transmission of COVID-19 early in the pandemic, 
Jacobson allowed judges to defer to executive orders that were broad and restrictive because of 
the severity of the pandemic. For certain First Amendment challenges involving the Free Exercise 
Clause, courts sometimes noted that Jacobson did not give absolute power to state actors during 
an emergency, and that an executive order “might be exercised . . . in such an arbitrary, 
unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of 
the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons."44 
 
38  Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (U.S. 1905) 
39 Wendy E. Parmet, Rediscovering Jacobson in the Era of COVID-19, 100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 117, 125 (2020), 
Northeastern University School of Law Research Paper No. 377-2020. 
40 Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 at 29. 
41 Parmet, supra note 38, at 125; Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11 at 27. 
42 See Fifth Circuit interpretation of Jacobson in In re Abbott, 956 F.3d 696, 711 (5th Cir. 2020), compared to 
Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 2020). 
43 Parmet, supra note 38, at 128; Lindsay F. Wiley and Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the 
Courts: The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 Harv. L. Rev. F. (2020). 
44 Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11 at 28. 
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But on the whole, the Court has found a real or rational relation to the public health crisis posed 
by COVID-19, even when heightened scrutiny has been triggered.45  
 
B. The Implications of Leaving Jacobson Behind 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s First Amendment decision in Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, most churches alleged disparate treatment of their religious gatherings 
compared to secular activities under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.46 A few 
challenges also argued that certain orders deserved heightened scrutiny because they were not 
content neutral.47 Although there is generally a heightened standard of scrutiny for free exercise 
violations which are not generally applicable, the courts have been willing to balance this against 
the Jacobson framework for a state’s public health interest and been unwilling to apply strict 
scrutiny.48 In particular, courts were likely to deny relief when expert testimony justified an order’s 
treatment of comparable activities, rather than finding motivation in the “substantive content of 
those activities.”49 Before October 2020, lower courts relied on two Supreme Court decisions, 
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom and Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 
to deny preliminary injunctions based on protecting public health interests under Jacobson.50 
However, in November 2020 the Court decided Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. 
Cuomo and enjoined the enforcement of Governor Cuomo’s order imposing occupancy limits on 
religious gatherings. Executive Order 202.68 placed a ten-person occupancy limit on worship 
services in the red zone but did not place any limits on essential businesses. In an orange zone, 
worship services were limited to 25 people, while both essential and non-essential businesses did 
not have restrictions.51 Plaintiffs, a Catholic Church and synagogue, challenged restrictive 
occupancy limits on religious services in certain “zones” conditioned on current rates of 
transmission.52 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the order’s enforcement while seeking appeal of the 
district court’s decision.  
In an extreme deviation from prior cases, the per curiam opinion granted relief after finding 
that the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims were likely to prevail.53 The Court pointed to the 
order’s non-neutral language that required them to apply strict scrutiny, and relied on a plurality 
opinion from the 1970s to note that First Amendment deprivations are always an irreparable harm 
 
45 See Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2020). 
46 See Andrew Wommack Ministries, Inc v. Polis, No. 20-CV-02922-CMA-KMT, 2020 WL 5810525 (D. Colo. Sept. 
29, 2020); see also Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, No. 1:20-cv-00156, (D. Me. May 9, 2020); see also Robinson 
v Murphy, No. 2:20-CV-5420-CCC-ESK, (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2020). 
47 See Ramsek v. Beshear, No. 3:20-CV-00036-GFVT, 2020 WL 3446249 (E.D. Ky. June 24, 2020) (holding that the 
executive ban on protests was content-neutral because it applied to all public gatherings, not just political rallies, but 
that the plaintiff was still entitled to preliminary injunction because the order was not narrowly tailored enough for a 
First Amendment claim).  
48 See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020); see also Calvary Chapel Dayton 
Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020). 
49 Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom, No. 20-55907, 2020 WL 5835219 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 2020). 
50 S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020); Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 
140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020). 
51 Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
This is a white paper and has not yet been published, but is the copyright of the author.
Version 3 
 11 
to congregants who are prevented from attending in-person services.54 The Court also found that 
the restrictions were excessively severe and not narrowly tailored, and due to the plaintiffs’ 
outbreak records and compliance with safety standards, did not find that it would be against public 
interest to enjoin the enforcement of the restrictions.55 Notably, the opinion did not mention 
Jacobson in discussing the standards for judicial review. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch criticized the majority’s failure to protect First 
Amendment rights in its prior COVID-19 cases, and expressly noted that, “Rather than apply a 
nonbinding and expired concurrence from South Bay, courts must resume applying the Free 
Exercise Clause. Today, a majority of the Court makes this plain.”56 Justice Gorsuch points to the 
Court’s earlier willingness to exercise deference because of the unknowns about COVID-19 
transmission, as well as their inclination to cite to Jacobson as the litmus test for judicial standards 
during a pandemic.57 He took the opportunity to criticize courts for consistently misinterpreting 
the Jacobson ruling on appropriate deference and judicial review, which he says: “involved an 
entirely different mode of analysis, an entirely different right, and an entirely different kind of 
restriction.”58 He also noted that the plaintiff in Jacobson had alternate means to vindicate his right 
to “bodily integrity,” whereas congregants deprived of their right to free exercise of religion would 
have no alternative to in-person worship.59 He states that Governor Cuomo’s restrictions were 
neither narrowly tailored, nor the least restrictive means to combat transmission, and said: “the 
State has effectively sought to ban all traditional forms of worship in affected “zones” whenever 
the Governor decrees and for as long as he chooses.”60  
In Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence, similar to his Calvary Chapel dissent, he contrasted 
the heightened severity of the New York restrictions with those at stake in South Bay and Calvary 
Chapel, and the fact that the New York order treats “houses of worship significantly worse than 
some secular businesses” but failed to justify this discriminatory treatment.61 “Judicial deference 
in an emergency or a crisis does not mean wholesale judicial abdication, especially when important 
questions of religious discrimination, racial discrimination, free speech, or the like are raised.”62  
In dissent, Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor cited to the district court’s finding that 
the order was grounded in science and treated worship services more favorably than comparably 
risky gatherings.63 The Justices also accepted the justification for targeting communal places where 
respiratory droplets from singing or talking are more likely to transmit the virus.64 “The nature of 
the epidemic, the spikes, the uncertainties, and the need for quick action…mean that the State has 
 
54 Id. at 67-68 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 
55 Id. at 66, 68. 
56 Id. at 70. 
57 See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020); see also Elim Romanian Pentecostal 
Church and Logos Baptist Ministries v Pritzker, No. 20-1811 (7th Cir. June 16, 2020). 
58 Roman Catholic, 141 S. Ct. at 63, 66. 
59 Id. at 71. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 74. 
63 Id. at 76. 
64 Id. at 78. 
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countervailing arguments based upon health, safety, and administrative considerations that must 
be balanced against the applicants’ First Amendment challenges.”65 
In a separate dissent, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan reiterated the court’s deviation from 
its prior decisions in South Bay and Calvary Chapel, and argued that the rule applied in those cases 
should have been applicable here.66 They also noted that in prior cases, the orders treated secular 
and religious activities in the exact same manner, whereas the New York order granted favorable 
treatment to houses of worship compared to their counterparts. “Justices of this Court play a deadly 
game in second guessing the expert judgment of health officials about the environments in which 
a contagious virus, now infecting a million Americans each week, spreads most easily.”67 They 
also expressed criticism of the idea that mentioning religion, even without disparate restrictions, 
triggers strict scrutiny.68 “The Constitution does not forbid States from responding to public health 
crises through regulations that treat religious institutions equally or more favorably than 
comparable secular institutions, particularly when those regulations save lives.”69  
More recently, in April 2021 the Supreme Court decided Tandon v. Newsom, which 
enjoined California’s restrictions on at-home religious exercise and cited Roman Catholic for the 
proposition that the state must show that the religious activity is more dangerous than comparable 
activities, “even when the same precautions are applied.”70 The impacts of Roman Catholic and 
Tandon v. Newsom are currently limited to First Amendment cases alleging violations of the free 
exercise clause, and Jacobson remains the binding precedent for public health deference because 
these recent decisions are not full and final.71 However, many courts are treating Roman Catholic 
and Tandon as precedential, and the South Bay judgments has been vacated and returned to the 
Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Tandon. These decisions may also impact other 
categories of COVID-related restrictions if plaintiffs argue that less deference should be granted 
for infringements on fundamental rights, even those that do not fall under the free exercise clause.72 
Roman Catholic has already been cited in recent freedom of expression challenges, including 
tattoo parlors closed under stay-at-home orders.73 Courts in these cases have generally cited to 
Jacobson and applied rational basis review in deference to the state’s interest in controlling the 
virus, and it remains to be seen how Roman Catholic and Tandon may be applied in the future. 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 79. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 80. 
69 Id. at 81. 
70 Tandon v. Newsom 
71 Amy Howe, Justices revive religious groups’ attempts to block COVID-related restrictions in Colorado, New 
Jersey, SCOTUS Blog, Dec. 15. 2020. https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/12/justices-revive-religious-groups-
attempts-to-block-covid-related-restrictions-in-colorado-new-jersey/. See High Plains Harvest Church v. Polis 141 
S. Ct. 527 (2020); see also Robinson v. Murphy, No. 20A95, 2020 WL 7346601 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2020). 
72 “Jacobson's standard affords States enduring a society threatening epidemic the discretion reasonably to restrict 
constitutional protections so long as the regulations have a "real or substantial relation" to protecting the public 
health and safety, and the restraint is not "beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of the rights secured." 
Delaney v. Baker, 2021 BL 2738 at*30 (D. Mass. Jan. 06, 2021) (quoting Jacobson 197 U.S. at 29, 31).  
73 See Mitchell v. Newsom, No. CV208709DSFGJSX, 2020 WL 7647741 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2020) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s use of Roman Catholic to argue that neutrally-applicable restrictions were not subject to the strict scrutiny 
required for Governor Cuomo’s order targeting the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community) 




C. Legal Challenges to Abuse of Executive Emergency Authority 
As questions emerge about shifting standards of judicial review, private parties and 
lawmakers continue to file challenges to statutes that grant governors the power to declare and 
renew emergencies and suspend or modify related rules and regulations. Most claims alleging 
failure to follow normal administrative procedures have been dismissed on the grounds that 
emergency management acts generally allow temporary suspension of these procedures.74 Other 
challenges argue that the statutes themselves constitute an impermissible delegation of legislative 
authority.75 In states that have one or more statutes that might be relevant in a pandemic, plaintiffs 
have argued that the executive did not act pursuant to the appropriate statute. 
Some lawsuits filed by legislators have been framed as partisan disputes about pandemic 
response, which have been exacerbated by a polarizing election year. While there are trends that 
show Republican Legislators and conservative lobbying groups undermining Democratic 
Governors, this wave of legal and legislative attacks can also be seen as part of a broader 
conservative advocacy agenda for smaller government and less state interference. 
 
Legal challenges to executive emergency powers from private parties 
Private parties challenging executive authority have alleged constitutional rights violations 
as well as abuse of constitutional and statutory power.76 In Massachusetts, as noted above, 
Governor Baker issued orders under the Civil Defense Act (CDA); these orders have faced 
multiple constitutional and statutory challenges. In Desrosiers v. Governor, business owners 
alleged personal constitutional violations, but also argued that the orders constituted an improper 
use of the CDA and violated the separation of powers doctrine in the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights.77 Plaintiffs argued that the CDA “vests the Governor with specified emergency powers 
only in the event of ‘immediate and specific cataclysmic events of limited duration,’” which did 
not include COVID-19.78 They further argued that the Public Health Act (PHA), which is intended 
to protect residents “from disease dangerous to the public health,” barred action under the CDA.79 
The Governor cited Jacobson and the wide latitude that is granted to the executive during a public 
health emergency. Additionally, the Governor argued that the legislature had the power to 
terminate emergency declarations but refused to do so, which further strengthened his assertion 
 
74 See Free Minn. Small Bus. Coal. v. Walz, No. A20-0641, 2020 BL 199740 (Minn. Ct. App. May 26, 2020) 
(finding that emergency executive orders are issued under the Minnesota Emergency Management Act, which 
authorizes governors to make, amend, and rescind orders without complying with normal administrative 
procedures). 
75 See Wolf v. Scarnati, 233 A.3d 679, 687 (Pa. 2020); see also In re Certified Questions From United States Dist. 
Court, W. Dist. of Michigan, S. Div., No. 161492, 2020 WL 5877599 (Mich. Oct. 2, 2020). 
76 Other challenges from private parties include cases heard by the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down the 
department of public health’s earliest social distancing orders in May 2020 on administrative procedure grounds. See 
Wisconsin v. Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497 (2020). Wisconsin courts have since upheld Governor Evers’ subsequent 
executive orders, despite numerous legal challenges regarding his decision to extend 60-day orders multiple times.76 
See Lindoo v. Evers, Case No. 20 CV 219 County Circuit Court Oct. 2020. 
77 Desrosiers v. Governor, 158 N.E.3d 827, 835 (2020). 
78 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 639, § 5. 
79 Id. 
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that the orders were lawful.80 Thus, the court considered whether COVID-19 might constitute a 
“natural cause” covered by the CDA, and whether the stand-alone public health emergency act 
precluded the governor from taking actions needed to “protect the public peace, health, security 
and safety, and to preserve the lives and property of the people of the commonwealth.”81 
Analyzing the legislative intent behind both statutes, as well as the plain meaning of 
“natural cause,” the court held that COVID-19 constituted a natural cause that would allow the 
governor to act pursuant to the CDA.82 The court also noted the statutes’ different purposes and 
pointed out that the CDA was intended to supplement the Governor’s public health powers. The 
CDA “contemplates the need to prepare for and respond to a serious disaster requiring swift, top-
down, coordinated relief efforts,” allowing the Governor to act at the magnitude required for a 
crisis like COVID.83 Regarding separation of powers, the court found that the Governor acted 
within the CDA’s legislatively-granted powers, citing precedent that a separation of powers 
violation implies that the executive has interfered with or prevented another branch from 
exercising its duties.84 In this case, the Governor exercised valid, delegated powers of a narrow 
and specific scope, under a statute that allows the legislature to revoke those powers at any time.85 
More recently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court invalidated three COVID-19 executive 
orders on March 31, 2021.86 In Fabick v. Evers, a businessman filed a suit against Wisconsin 
Governor Evers challenging three consecutive executive orders, one of which was a general mask 
mandate. Governor Evers issued these orders pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 323.10, which authorizes the 
Governor to issue a state of emergency lasting 60-days, with the possibility of renewal. The 
legislature may terminate a declaration through joint resolution. Like Desrosiers v. Baker, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court heard the suit as an original action due to its bearing on future COVID-
19 executive orders.87 The plaintiff argued that the “enabling condition” or “particular illness or 
pandemic” had not changed since the issuance of the first order, and thus was an abuse of executive 
power.  
 The Governor attempted to argue that the recent loss of federal nutrition benefits was a 
justifiable new condition that allowed him to renew the order. However, the court rejected this 
argument and in a four-three decision, found two-out-of-three orders unlawful and stated that: 
“The Governor cannot make an end run around legislative revocation simply by itemizing a 
previously unidentified justification for the state of emergency.”88 The court also found that the 
legislature’s refusal to terminate an executive order does not inherently mean that the order was 
lawful, unlike the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court which found that this argument weighed 
in favor of the Governor’s authority.89 
 
80 Brief of Appellee at 46, Desrosiers v. Governor, 158 N.E.3d 837 (2020) (No. SJC-12983). 
81 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 639, § 5. 
82 Desrosiers v. Governor, 158 N.E.3d at 837. 
83 Id. at 838. 
84 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635-637, 72 S.Ct. 863 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
85 Desrosiers v. Governor, 158 N.E.3d at 841. 
86 Fabick v. Evers, No. 2020AP1718-OA, WL 1201478 (Wis. March 31, 2021). 
87 Id. at 24. 
88 Id. at 25. 
89 Id. at 23. 




Legal challenges to executive emergency powers from within the legislature 
 
Pennsylvania: Upholding constitutional standards for terminating emergency declarations 
Governor Wolf first faced a challenge from private businesses and individuals alleging that 
his emergency declarations violated both the constitution and emergency statutes.90 In April 2020, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied relief and found that the declarations had been a proper 
exercise of executive authority issued pursuant to a statute passed by the General Assembly.91 
When Republican lawmakers attempted to terminate a subsequent emergency declaration through 
concurrent resolution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard the Governor’s challenge to their 
action in Wolf v. Scarnati.92 The State Senate President Pro Tempore, Senate Majority Leader, and 
Senate Republican Caucus filed a concurrent resolution terminating the Governor’s renewed 
declaration without his approval, arguing that the Emergency Management Services Code (EMSC) 
allows the General Assembly to overturn an emergency declaration absent presentment.93  
Pointing to three exceptions to the state constitution’s presentment requirement, lawmakers 
argued that the emergency declaration was a “declaration of fact” rather than a resolution with 
binding legal effect, and thus did not require the Governor’s approval to overturn.94 Additionally, 
they argued that requiring the legislature to present a resolution would allow the Governor to 
suspend normal rules and regulations by consistently renewing emergency declarations, in 
violation of the non-delegation doctrine.95 The court held that the constitution did not allow the 
legislature to act unilaterally to terminate a state of emergency (essentially a legislative veto) 
through a concurrent resolution, as an emergency declaration did not fall into one of the three 
constitutional exceptions to constitutional presentment requirement for all actions “that have the 
effect of legislating.”96 The court noted specifically that the lawmakers could not avoid 
constitutional standards simply by “characterizing the legislation as a delegation of emergency 
powers,” even if the standards seem “cumbersome” under the circumstances.97  
The court also found that, even if the EMSC grants the Governor temporary power to 
suspend laws, the delegated powers were constitutionally permissible because of the specific 
nature of his authority: “The powers delegated to the Governor are admittedly far-reaching, but 
nonetheless are specific. For example, the Governor can ‘‘[s]uspend the provisions of any 
regulatory statute if strict compliance with the provisions would in any way prevent, hinder or 
delay necessary action in coping with the emergency.’’98 The court noted that authority can be 
conferred, without creating a separation of powers issue, if two basic principles are met: “First, ... 
the General Assembly must make the basic policy choices, and second, the legislation must include 
 
90 Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872 (Pa.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 239 (2020). 
91 Id. 
92 Wolf v. Scarnati, 233 A.3d 679, 687 (Pa. 2020). 
93 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301 (a)(c). 
94 Wolf v. Scarnati, 233 A.3d at 688-90. 
95 Id. at 699. 
96 Id. at 692, 702. 
97 Id. at 694 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946). 
98 Id. at 705 (quoting 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)). 
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adequate standards which will guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated administrative 
functions.”99 Like many other orders facing non-delegation doctrine challenges, the court found 
that because the emergency code included limits to the Governor’s authority to suspend laws, it 
would be unconstitutional for the legislature to rescind powers they had rightfully delegated to the 
executive branch.100 
 
Michigan: Invalidating state emergency management laws 
Not all courts have ruled with such deference to executive authority, as noted above in 
Fabick v. Evers. Fabick follows the Michigan Supreme Court’s narrow 4-3 decision that 
invalidated multiple executive orders and found one of the state’s emergency management statutes 
to be unconstitutional. Plaintiffs In re Certified Questions From United States Dist. Court, W. Dist. 
of Michigan, S. Div., challenged an order that temporarily banned certain medical procedures.101 
They alleged that the Governor abused her executive authority by issuing two consecutive 
emergency declaration under the Emergency Management Act (EMA) without legislative 
approval, and also argued that the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 (EPGA) was 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.102  
The EMA requires that the Governor terminate an emergency declaration after 28 days 
unless she receives approval to extend it through a joint legislative resolution.103 However, in 
responding to the pandemic, the Governor terminated the first executive order and issued a new 
order without legislative approval. She argued that the EMA’s 28-day limit constituted “an 
impermissible legislative veto.”104 However, the court rejected this assertion on the grounds that 
it is constitutionally permissible for the legislature to create durational limits when it delegates 
specific powers, and subsequently invalidated her post-April 30th orders.105  
Turning to the validity of the EPGA,106 the majority rejected the concurrence’s conjecture 
that the EMA’s inclusion of “epidemics” should preclude the Governor from acting pursuant to 
the EPGA during a pandemic, but they nonetheless found the EPGA to be an unconstitutional 
delegation of authority.107 “As the scope of the powers conferred upon the Governor by the 
Legislature becomes increasingly broad, in regard to both the subject matter and their duration, 
the standards imposed upon the Governor's discretion…must correspondingly become more 
 
99 Id. at 704 (quoting Protz v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827, 834 (2017)). 
100 Id. at 707. 
101 In re Certified Questions From United States Dist. Court, W. Dist. of Michigan, S. Div., No. 161492, 2020 WL 
5877599 at *4 (Mich. Oct. 2, 2020). 
102 Id. at *3 (Mich. Oct. 2, 2020). 
103 MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 30.403. 
104 In re Certified Questions From United States Dist. Court, W. Dist. of Michigan, S. Div., No. 161492, 2020 WL 
5877599 at *7. 
105 Id. at *7,8. 
106 The EPGA grants the Governor authority to “promulgate orders, rules, and regulations…consider[ed] necessary 
to protect life and property,” but does not mention pandemics, disease, or public health. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 
10.31(1)(1). 
107 In re Certified Questions From United States Dist. Court, W. Dist. of Michigan, S. Div., No. 161492, 2020 WL 
5877599 at *11,12. 
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detailed and precise.”108 They noted that, unlike the EMA, the EPGA allows an emergency 
declaration to continue indefinitely until the governor terminates it, which creates an indefinite 
delegation of power.109 The court analyzed the order’s wide-ranging restrictions and requirements 
imposed on business, institutions, and found that the terms “necessary” and “reasonable” were too 
broadly construed to place effective limits on the scope of executive power.110  
This ruling set the stage for the subsequent decision in a challenge brought by the Michigan 
House of Representatives and Senate, which invalidated the Governor’s executive orders and 
affirmed that the EPGA was unconstitutional.111 The dissenting Justice in both opinions criticized 
the majority’s application of the non-delegation doctrine, arguing that both the State Supreme 
Court and the US Supreme Court had, before this case, “[up]held every delegation that had some 
standards to guide the decision-maker’s discretion.”112 She noted that the terms “reasonableness” 
and “necessary” are frequently deemed appropriate standards for a constitutional delegation of 
power, and the majority substantially deviated from this standard by relying on non-binding 
precedent.113  
 
Implications for the separation of powers 
The Pennsylvania and Michigan opinions highlight several concerns about emergency 
statutes and the balance between executive authority, adequate public health protections, and 
sufficient legislative accountability mechanisms. First, Wolf v. Scarnati demonstrates the court’s 
interpretation of an emergency statute that is silent on the procedural mechanisms required to 
terminate an executive order. The Pennsylvania court ruled in the Governor’s favor and found that 
normal constitutional protections apply to legislative checks, even during a state of emergency. 
However, it would be quite easy for a court to arrive at the opposite conclusion and allow the 
legislature to terminate an order without consulting public health officials or triggering an override 
vote of a legislative veto. The rulings also suggest that there are risks associated with statutes 
defining “disaster” in broad terms, versus statutes that explicitly apply to pandemics or public 
health emergencies. In Massachusetts, the court was willing to interpret “natural cause” to include 
a pandemic, whereas other courts have refused to accept that a naturally occurring disaster includes 
pandemic response. In the future, governors may need to consider whether the general emergency 
statute or the tailored public health statute is a more appropriate grant of executive power.  
 And finally, the Michigan ruling calls into question the standard by which courts may 
interpret an acceptable delegation of power. Although not binding on other states, it sets a 
precedent to allow the terms “reasonable” and “necessary” to signal excessively broad executive 
powers. The Michigan court’s focus on the duration of the emergency is also concerning, noting 
that “the conferral of indefinite authority accords a greater accumulation of power than does the 
 
108 Id. at *15. 
109 Id. at *16. 
110 Id. at *17,18. 
111 House of Representatives v. Governor, 949 N.W.2d 276 (Mich. 2020). 
112 In re Certified Questions From United States Dist. Court , W. Dist. of Michigan, S. Div., No. 161492, 2020 WL 
5877599 at *43. 
113 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 204 L. Ed. 2d 522, reh'g denied, 140 S. Ct. 579, 205 L. Ed. 2d 378 
(2019); House of Representatives v. Governor, 949 N.W.2d 276 (Mich. 2020). 
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grant of temporary authority.”114 Some emergency management statutes have durational limits 
ranging from 28 to 90 days; these limits may be appropriate in some situations, but have not been 
adequate for COVID-19 response.  
 
D. Preventing Government Overreach Through Legislative Reform 
Resistance to executive authority has also sparked a wave of legislative reforms aimed at 
restoring legislative checks on the executive and defining the parameters of emergency powers. 
Some of these legislative reforms may provide helpful clarification for the future, as time limits 
on emergency declarations and explicit legislative checks are generally important to maintain a 
balance of power. 15 legislatures have proposed bills that would allow them to convene an 
emergency session by two-thirds majority without the prior authorization of the governor, which 
may be helpful if an emergency vote is required. However, the extreme variation and arbitrary 
nature of many of these bills reflects that these efforts are less about rational responses to future 
pandemics, and more about broadly curtailing executive authority and preventing executive 
agencies from exercising their expertise during a public health emergency. Without additional 
reforms that ensure legislatures base their decisions on public health data and expertise, some of 
these reforms have simply created additional bureaucratic barriers and invalidated veto power in 
states with split-party executive and legislative branches. 
There are now legislative efforts pending in almost every state to limit emergency 
declarations to as little as seven days, which would require governors to continually request 
extensions. Very few of these proposals allow a governor to renew or extend the initial declaration 
without providing a justification for the renewal or requiring a joint resolution from the 
legislature.115 For example, Pennsylvania Senate Bill 231 would reduce the length of a disaster 
from 90 days to 30 days, and renewal would require a legislative majority approval.116 In Kansas, 
the legislature successfully curbed executive authority by amending the Kansas Emergency 
Management Act and requiring approval from at least 6 lawmakers on the State Finance 
Committee prior to proclaiming additional Covid-19 related emergency orders.117 Legislatures 
have also addressed statutes that were previously silent on the duration of an emergency, including 
in Massachusetts, where the House has proposed a 90-day duration for emergencies and the 
emergency powers of the Public Health Commissioner.118 Some laws that were not explicit about 
 
114 In re Certified Questions From United States Dist. Court, W. Dist. of Michigan, S. Div., No. 161492, 2020 WL 
5877599 at *14. 
115 Maryland House Bill 17 – limits state of emergency to 14 days, joint resolution from GA extends emergency for 
no more than 14 days; orders may not prohibit or limit in-person religious activities or treat them in a disparate 
manner [Intro: 1.13.2021, pending in House Cmte]; Utah Senate Bill 195 – amends provisions related to emergency 
powers and public health emergencies. Limits public health emergencies to 30 days [intro: 2.12.2021, PASSED 
Senate: 2.23.2021 Adopted: 3.24.2021]; Wyoming House Bill 113 – limits duration of any public health order 
imposed on an area or individual to 30 days, can be extended another 30 days if order has been ratified by Governor 
and declared under a public health emergency [Intro: 2.5.2021] 
116 S.B. 231 (Pa. 2021-2022). 
117H.B. 2016, 2020 Spec. Sess. (Ky. 2020); Dough Carder, Lawmakers Overwhelmingly pass compromise COVID-
19 bill, June 4, 2020,  https://www.republic-online.com/news/localnews/lawmakers-overwhelmingly-pass-
compromise-covid-19-bill/article316674b8-a6bc-11ea-adce-234f5277801b.html. 
118 H.D. 3270, An act relative to the governor’s power to declare an emergency, 192nd Legis. Sess. (Ma. 2021-2022). 
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whether the executive or legislative branch could terminate a declaration have largely clarified that 
the legislature can terminate an executive order at any time.119   
A few legislatures have also proposed bills that explicitly protect individual constitutional 
rights from infringement by executive orders and regulations. For example, bills have been filed 
to protect religious services, sale of firearms,120 and sale of alcohol. Some bills would limit the 
usage of essential and non-essential business designations. 12 states have proposed legislation that 
would curtail the Governor’s ability to interfere with attending or operating a place of worship.121 
Some bills have also proposed that worship services be designated “essential services” during a 
disaster.122 
These legislative efforts have not only been aimed at executive authority but have also 
attacked the powers granted to public health officials. As of December 2020,legislatures in over 
24 states had introduced bills that would curb local public health authority to act autonomously 
during emergencies.123 Seven legislatures have proposed amendments to either their public health 
emergency law or general emergency management law to incorporate “pandemic” or further define 
public health emergency.124 For example, in Michigan, an initiative to limit the department of 
public health to using 28-day emergency orders has been approved by the Senate.125  The Michigan 
House and Senate also proposed amendments to the Public Health Code in early 2021, one of 
which would prohibit local health officials from issuing gathering limitations on religious services 
and would allow businesses to remain in operation as long as they were in compliance with health 
guidelines.126 
The rush to curb executive authority during this pandemic also means that public health 
emergency laws may reflect epidemiological data that is not relevant to the next one. For example, 
there are two bills in Michigan that would amend the Public Health Code and local health officials’ 
authority to issue dining, gathering, and venue restrictions during a pandemic.127 However, these 
guidelines are based on COVID-19 risks of transmission, these measures may not be as effective 
for a future virus. A second bill would prohibit local health officials from closing schools or 
prohibiting certain sporting events unless the epidemic has reached a certain threshold of 
confirmed cases within a 14-day period. This reflects the current science around COVID-19 which 
suggests that children face reduced risk of infection, which may not be true in future pandemics. 
In addition to pending legislation, two state legislatures have successfully passed 
constitutional amendments through both the house and senate that limit executive authority during 
 
119 BALLOTPEDIA, Checks and Balances: State lawmakers press for oversight of emergency powers, (April 13, 2021) 
  https://news.ballotpedia.org/2021/04/13/checks-and-balances-state-lawmakers-press-for-oversight-of-emergency-
powers/. 
120 Georgia, Kansas, Texas 
121 Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin 
122 Montana and Texas. 
123 Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Hannah Recht, Michelle R. Smith, and Lauren Weber, Pandemic Backlash Jeopardizes 
Public Health Powers, Leaders, Kaiser Family Foundation (Dec. 15 2020) 
https://khn.org/news/article/pandemic-backlash-jeopardizes-public-health-powers-leaders/. 
124 See Connecticut House Bill 5653; see also Florida Senate Bill 2006; see also Minnesota House Bill 1515. 
125 https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2019-2020/billintroduced/Senate/pdf/2020-SIB-1253.pdf 
126 H.B. 4268, 101st Legis. Sess. (Mi. 2021-2022).  
127 S.B.  250 , 101st Legis. Sess. (Mi. 2021-2022). 
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an emergency. For example, Pennsylvania Republican lawmakers introduced and passed Senate 
Bill 1166 on July 15, 2020.128 The amendment reduces the duration of an emergency declaration 
without a legislative concurrent resolution from 90-days to 21-days. It also requires additional 
specifications in each declaration, including details about the nature of the disaster or emergency, 
identification of specific areas under threat, and how each threat will be managed. The amendments 
would also prohibit the governor’s power to veto the General Assembly’s resolution terminating a 
declaration. At least 11 states have proposed similar amendments. 
 Just as legislative reform may have some positive outcomes, there is nothing inherently 
problematic about constitutional amendments that clarify duties and accountability. As some 
scholars have argued, “the ambiguity latent in the police power suggests that we should be more 
…intentional in structuring the police power of the executive and the legislative 
branches…Otherwise, we will continue to be vexed as new emergencies arise with the question of 
who should be able to act, when, and whether or not unilaterally.”129 Improving the balance of 
power alone, without accounting for public health expertise and the types of emergencies we may 




PART III: WHEN PANDEMICS ARE POLITICIZED: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE 
 
Due to the current political moment, the COVID-19 pandemic has been hyper-politicized 
and marked by extreme partisan divides about the appropriate response and bounds of authority 
during a public health emergency. There has been a lot of attention on the partisan nature of 
challenges to Democratic Governors and unwillingness to comply with public health orders.  
However, rather than thinking about it solely as partisan backlash led by Republican legislators 
and encouraged by the Trump Administration, perhaps it is more useful to look beyond the current 
political moment to the historical roots of politicized responses to public health crises. If policy 
makers learn from challenges posed to executive authority throughout the last century during times 
of crisis, new governance structures and public health strategies could potentially override the 
predictable backlash against government overreach and infringement on individual liberties. 
I distinguish between the concepts of partisan and politicized. Partisan response often 
aligns with a particular political party and impacts behavior—from politicians to individual people. 
This manifests in disparate levels of compliance with public health measures, and contributes to 
highly critical, partisan rhetoric in mainstream media that shapes public sentiments about those in 
power. I argue that partisanship can be a predictable outcome of a public health crisis, which can 
be exacerbated by various social and political factors like elections or recessions, but the COVID-
19 pandemic has created an unprecedent degree of such partisanship. 
 
128 In order to appear on the ballot, the amendment must pass both houses in two consecutive legislative sessions; the 
amendments package passed the General Assembly once in 2020, and so far, a House committee has approved the 
package in the current session.   
129 Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 1239. 
This is a white paper and has not yet been published, but is the copyright of the author.
Version 3 
 21 
On the other hand, politicization of a public health crisis can bleed into a broader 
ideological thread of reforms towards small government and minimal intervention. This type of 
“political activism” often means that the legislation pushed through during a pandemic has no 
bearing on the current public health crisis or those that arise in the future. It is more focused on 
power than on public health expertise or data and can have long lasting implications for the policies 
and power structures that are available during the next pandemic.  
 
A. Pandemic Response in The Context of The Current Political Moment 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, a particular confluence of events not only exacerbated 
the severity of the pandemic, but also showed a stark, partisan divide in public health response. 
Not only did it occur during the last year of the Trump Administration, election politics and a new 
Supreme Court bench provided a perfect platform for the GOP. Over the past five years, the GOP 
has initiated legislative reforms stripping power from Democratic governors.130 While these 
attacks have been legislative, Republican lawmakers are now able to turn to the judiciary. Many 
of the same state GOPs are now waging legal challenges to the COVID-19 response, taking the 
opportunity to further undermine important executive powers that allow urgent response public 
health crises. Although it is important to maintain judicial review during a state of emergency,131 
there is a risk that increasingly politicized courts and legal challenges will undermine the statutory 
frameworks that allow executives to control infectious diseases.  
Republican lawmakers have challenged Democratic governors in seven out of thirteen 
states where there is a partisan split across branches.132  Governors have also faced challenges from 
Republican lawmakers in states where Democrats control both the executive and the legislative 
branch. For example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey heard New Jersey Republican State 
Committee v Murphy,133 where plaintiffs alleged that a proposed debt issuance bill would violate 
the state constitution’s debt limitation clause. The Court ruled that the bill was constitutional under 
the emergency exception to the debt limitation clause, but also urged lawmakers to craft more 
explicit legislation in the future to prevent judicial review.134 In Colorado, the Supreme Court 
refused to hear a Republican lawmaker’s claim alleging that the state’s emergency act was 
 
130 Tim Lau, Power Grabs in Wisconsin and Michigan Undermine Democracy, Brennan Center for Justice (Dec. 3, 
2018) https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/power-grabs-wisconsin-and-michigan-undermine-
democracy; Russ Feingold, Republicans are undermining democracy state by state, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2018)  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/dec/09/republicans-michigan-wisconsin-strip-power-democrats-
undermine-democracy; Perry Bacon, Five Ways Trump And GOP Officials Are Undermining The Election Process, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 11, 2020) https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/five-ways-trump-and-gop-officials-are-
undermining-the-election-process/. 
131 Wiley and Vladeck, supra note 42. 
132 Sophie Quinton, GOP Lawsuits Restrain Governors’ COVID-19 Actions, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST (Nov. 17, 
2020) https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/11/17/gop-lawsuits-restrain-
governors-covid-19-actions (last visited Jan. 10, 2020); See Beshear v. Acree, 2020 BL 438405 at *24, 26 (Ky. Nov. 
12, 2020) (reversing Circuit Court restraining order prohibiting enforcement of Governor’s executive orders, finding 
that the lower court had abused its discretion in issuing an injunction and noting that the emergency statute was a 
constitutionally permissible delegation of power that included a time limit, public notice requirement, and specific, 
enumerated emergency powers). 
133 N.J. Republican State Comm. v. Murphy, 243 N.J. 574 (2020). 
134 Id. 
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unconstitutional and that emergency powers to issue a mask mandate had been improperly 
delegated to the executive.135 In Connecticut, Republican minority-leaders forced a formal vote of 
the committee that could terminate Governor Lamonte’s emergency declaration even though they 
would be out-voted, but did so to publicly voice their opposition to his exercise of executive 
power.136 In addition to legal challenges related to executive orders, there have also been at least 
12 recall efforts launched against governors, almost all of which were fully or partially related to 
their pandemic response, including governors who have faced partisan challenges in Michigan, 
Colorado, Louisiana, Oregon, New Jersey, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.137  
However, framing the challenges to executive authority as sweeping attacks on Democratic 
governors does not tell the whole story. Partisanship can also explain flip-flopping of opinion on 
public health response, where the party line shifts depending on the type of emergency and who is 
most impacted. The next public health emergency may look vastly different from COVID-19 in 
terms of transmission, incubation periods, and which populations are most at-risk. If it were a 
different virus, there may be very different stakeholders advocating for safety measures or 
challenging restrictions to personal freedoms. For example, during the Zika outbreak, Republicans 
were more likely to push for a robust public health response because the virus was concentrated in 
warmer, Southern states and governors had a vested interest in well-funded mitigation efforts.138  
As COVID-19 spread during the Trump Administration, Democratic governors were more 
likely to issue sweeping restrictive measures to contain the pandemic, resulting in challenges to 
their authority. Now under the Biden Administration, there are conservative governors, most 
recently Governor Abbott of Texas, who are rapidly reopening states while also preempting local 
attempts to maintain safety measures.139   
If the partisan nature of public health response during COVID-19 is viewed in isolation, 
there is a risk that the confluence of events in this moment of time will be seen as the driving force 
behind noncompliance and resistance to mitigation efforts. Resistance to particular policies and 
the positions of Democrats and Republicans that were relevant in this pandemic may also 
unnecessarily influence the type of emergency response we see in the future.  
 
B. Historical Roots of Politicized Responses to Public Health Crises 
The partisan nature of legal challenges to COVID-19 executive orders thus far has been 
seen as a consequence of Republican efforts to undermine Democratic governors and respond to 
concerns about the economic impacts of long-term shutdowns. However, these reactions could 
more aptly be seen as a part of a historical trend of politicized resistance to any public health or 
 
135 Neville v. Polis was refiled in Denver District Court on August 30, 2020. 
136 Mark Pazniokas, Leaders will vote, if only for the political show, on extending Lamont’s emergency powers, THE 
CT MIRROR (Sep. 3, 2020) https://ctmirror.org/2020/09/03/leaders-will-vote-if-only-for-the-political-show-on-
extending-lamonts-emergency-powers/. 
137 Ballotpedia, Gubernatorial Recalls 2020, https://ballotpedia.org/Gubernatorialrecalls#2020. 
138 Singer PM, Willison CE, Greer SL., Infectious disease, public health, and politics: United States response to 
Ebola and Zika, 41(4) J PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 399-409 (Aug. 2020). 
139 https://apnews.com/article/ken-paxton-austin-coronavirus-pandemic-texas-greg-abbott-
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social policy intervention that threatens business interests and individual liberties or overextends 
state police powers. 
Over the last 150 years, similar partisan divides have emerged during every public health 
crisis that threatened the nation, from the cholera epidemic in the 1890s to the Ebola crisis in 2014. 
When cholera arrived in New York City on steam ships from Europe in 1892, both the state and 
federal government were forced to set up quarantine sites, and in many cases, the quality of 
quarantine facilities was dependent on whether passengers were from steerage or “cabin-class.”140 
There was also controversy about the Board of Health seizing personal property that had been 
exposed to typhus or cholera and refusing to compensate the owners. As greater numbers of upper- 
and middle-class New Yorkers (and American citizens) were forced to quarantine, public 
opposition to the government’s public health measures suggests that “the real threat came not from 
cholera but from state action, which many believed to be illegal.”141 In particular, the Chamber of 
Commerce of the State of New York became extremely vocal about state action, and criticized it 
as being “indecisive [and] ignorant” and “quickly connected cholera to the well-being of the 
market.”142 The cholera epidemic resulted in controversies about whether state governments 
should have jurisdiction over quarantine laws, and provoked strong commercial backlash against 
quarantine measures that would predictably emerge during crisis throughout the 19th Century. 
There were also lingering questions and a lack of jurisprudence about state police powers 
infringement on individual liberties during an epidemic. Jacobson was decided just a few years 
later. 
Jacobson marked the first time that a mandated vaccination policy made it to the Supreme 
Court. At the time, the concept of liberty was quite different than it is today, in that people 
generally accepted that “real liberty requires more than the absence of government,”143 but it did 
not come without an anti-government backlash. Although there were active anti-vaccination 
groups that funded the case, three years after Jacobson, the Anti-Vaccination League was founded, 
with the objective to “abolish oppressive medical laws” and prevent “enlarge[ing] state medicine 
at the expense of the freedom of the individual.”144  
There was also widespread resistance to a mask mandate issued by the San Francisco Board 
of Health during the 1918 Spanish Influenza, as well as backlash against people who refused to 
wear them—“mask slackers”—which included the Mayor of San Francisco.145 A formal 
organization, the Anti-Mask League,146 claimed that “the muzzle is a farce and an outrage against 
our liberties’ and that the city government should “dedicate itself to cleaning up the city instead of 
 
140 Felice Batlan, Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and Quarantines Past and Future, 80 TEMP. L. 
REV. 53, 86 (2007). 
141 Id. at 86. 
142 Id. at 53, 85. 
143 Wendy Parmet, Rethinking Freedom: Liberty vs. health is a false dichotomy, INSTITUTE OF ART AND IDEAS (88) 
(May 5, 2020) https://iai.tv/articles/rethinking-freedom-auid-1531. 
144 Towards a Twenty-First-Century Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 121 HARV. L. REV 1820, 1823 (May 2008) 
https://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/a_twenty-first-century_jacobson_v_massachusetts.pdf 
145 The Intersection Of Public Safety, Public Health, And Law, 2020 Txcle-Agl 8-Ii. 
146 Kiona Smith, Protesting During A Pandemic Isn’t New: Meet The Anti-Mask League Of 1918, FORBES (Apr. 29, 
2020) https://www.forbes.com/sites/kionasmith/2020/04/29/protesting-during-a-pandemic-isnt-new-meet-the-anti-
mask-league/?sh=3cab754912f9#699a831312f9 (Last accessed Mar. 28, 2021). 
This is a white paper and has not yet been published, but is the copyright of the author.
Version 3 
 24 
implementing ‘autocratic rules.’”147 During the second wave of the pandemic in 1919, over 4,000 
people gathered to protest the ongoing mask requirement. Similar to the current disputes between 
governors and local authorities, the San Francisco Board of Health blamed the resistance on the 
state board of health’s refusal to issue a universal mask mandate and downplay mask 
effectiveness.148 
There are some factors which can exacerbate the obvious partisan nature of a public health 
crisis, demonstrated by the 2014 Ebola outbreak which occurred during a similar political moment 
and featured familiar partisan divides about the appropriate response and level of government 
intervention required.149 “Contrary to the suggestions of Ebola-focused political commentators, 
although elections may raise the stakes and drive politicians to increasingly partisan rhetoric…the 
partisan history of public health perception suggests that, at least for the American public, political 
allegiance trumps support for specific disease policies.”150 While both the CDC and the Obama 
administration publicly aligned with health officials and downplayed the threat of transmission 
based on scientific evidence, Donald Trump used his pre-presidency Twitter platform to criticize 
the government’s response to the pandemic, accuse the CDC of lying, demand a West African 
travel ban, and argue that people exposed to Ebola should not be allowed back in the country 
because they “must suffer the consequences” of volunteering in “faraway places.”151 Trump was 
not alone: the outbreak took place during midterm elections, and Senators Ted Cruz and Rand 
Paul, as well as Governor Rick Perry, took the opportunity to attack the Obama administration’s 
inaction and failure to take Ebola seriously.152  Polling during the avian flu epidemic and the H1N1 
crisis showed that Republicans were statistically more likely to approve of the Bush 
Administration’s response, while Democrats were “nearly twice as likely as to support the vaccine 
for the influenza strain H1N1 (“swine flu”) proposed by the Obama Administration.”153 
While the Ebola panic stirred up by Republicans contributed to increasing fears about 
immigration,154 the Democratic-led response to COVID-19 has allowed Republicans and small-
government lobbyists to provoke fears about government overreach and infringement on personal 
freedoms, while underplaying the scientifically backed need for stringent public health measures. 
In turn, the fractured response and Republican criticism has had a significant impact on compliance 
with public health measures. 155 
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2017) https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/04/trump-ebola-tweets/. 
150 Cailin Hong, The Politicization of Disease, PRINCETON PUBLIC HEALTH REVIEW (Dec. 7, 2014) 
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155 Clinton J, Cohen J, Lapinski J, Trussler M., Partisan pandemic: How partisanship and public health concerns 
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C. Politicized Attacks on The Overreach of State Government 
Looking beyond partisanship, a politicized pandemic reaction has the potential to 
systemically change our governing institutions and shift concentrations of power and resources 
beyond the context of a public health emergency. The pandemic, or really any crisis, can be used 
to justify attacks on state governments, especially when there is political will and substantial 
resources behind business interests and First Amendment rights. For example, in response to waves 
of New Deal legislation, the American Liberty League (ALL) was formed in 1934 to provide legal 
representation for those who wanted to challenge the allegedly broad abuse of government 
authority.156 ALL identified itself as a bi-partisan organization (often compared to the Modern-day 
Tea Party), like groups today that claim to be “non-partisan.” It was founded by legislators and 
businessmen who wanted to launch legal challenges and high-profile media campaigns to 
undermine New Deal legislation.157 A radio address from one of the founders stated that:  
“The New Deal has sought to destroy the American system of government composed 
of three coordinate branches and to upset the dual sovereignty as between state and 
nation which the Constitution provides. [It] represents the attempt….to set up a 
totalitarian government, one which recognizes no sphere of individual or business 
life as immune from governmental authority and which submerges the welfare of 
the individual to that of the government.”158 
 
One month before the WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic, similar sentiments were expressed 
at the Conservative Political Action Conference, where President Trump’s top economic advisor 
said: “What is or could sink the American economy is the socialism coming from our friends on 
the other side of the aisle.”159 Not only has there been a general, conservative movement against 
state level restrictions coming directly from the Department of Justice and other administration 
officials, there is also a significant number of privately financed “non-partisan” organizations 
which have represented plaintiffs in lawsuits against governors.160 For example, the New Civil 
Liberties Alliance (NCLA), a non-partisan, non-profit organization, represents plaintiffs in 
multiple lawsuits challenging COVID-19 executive orders, including the plaintiffs in Desrosiers 
v. Baker. Their mission statement is to “tame the unlawful power of state and federal agencies and 
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to foster a new civil liberties movement that will help restore Americans’ fundamental rights.”161 
In March 2020, NCLA launched its campaign to protect civil liberties and combat government 
overreach, stating that: “The COVID-19 pandemic has proven to be a threat not only to the health 
and safety of Americans, but also to our way of life…. As elected leaders and bureaucrats have 
taken turns trampling civil rights under foot, NCLA has been working overtime to restore the 
constitutional guardrails on the Administrative State’s pandemic response.”162 Some of these 
lobbying groups have formed as a result of the pandemic, including the Citizen Action Defense 
Fund, which is actively challenging executive orders in Washington State.163 Others have been 
active at the state level for years and are actively supporting challenges with amicus briefs. For 
example, Americans for Prosperity-WI filed an amicus brief in the lawsuit against Governor Evers’ 
order “Safer at Home.”164 Its mission statement highlights the core values of “separation of 
powers” and “honoring the legislature and public’s role in addressing the crisis, government is 
more likely to develop the goodwill necessary for successful outcomes.” 
 In addition to private libertarian groups channeling resources into lawsuits, there are also 
efforts to push state legislation that would severely restrict executive authority. The American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) proposed a model law in August 2020, the “Emergency 
Power Limitation Act, which imposes a “narrowly tailored” requirement to any emergency order 
and a mandatory expiration of an emergency after seven days.165 ALEC is not only focused on 
executive authority but on the legislature’s ability to temporarily infringe on personal liberty or 
impose regulatory burdens on private parties. Its model policy, “Expedited Suspension And 
Legislative Repeal Of Harmful Rules Act,” recommends extensive rulemaking requirements and 
oversight of legislative action during an emergency.166 
The language from these model acts has appeared in several state bills, including in 
Massachusetts. A Massachusetts House Representative, who is also the MA State Chair for ALEC, 
filed an amendment to the CDA that includes language from ALEC’s proposed emergency powers 
limitation act. It calls for narrowly tailored restrictions and requires state courts to expedite hearing 
challenges to any orders that infringe on individual liberties. The amendment limits an emergency 
to 30-days, allows the legislature to vote to terminate any order or decree, and prohibits the 
Governor from reissuing the same order without proof of “significantly changed circumstances.” 
In the case of changed circumstances, the Governor may reissue the order once for up to three 
days.167 There is also a pending amendment that imposes a 90-day limit on all powers granted to 
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To combat the implications of a politicized pandemic, it is important not to rush 
legislation based on the fear and uncertainty arising from legal challenges and other reforms. 
Shaping future public health policy during the height of the crisis itself will not result in effective 
public health governance and might even prevent meaningful reform if partisan debates about the 
current pandemic are the driving force behind the legislation. 
 
PART IV: CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE 
 
As vaccines become available across the country, it would be prudent for state governments 
to take stock of lessons learned and create guidelines for the next pandemic, even if it differs vastly 
from COVID-19. I review three proposed areas of intervention that could mitigate politicized 
backlash to executive emergency authority and improve future pandemic response.  
 
A. Strengthening Statutory Frameworks for Public Health Response 
 
“Law is not just one means of specifying a desirable practice but also the primary 
social tool for generalizing or scaling up practices judged collectively beneficial, 
forestalling negative behavior, and setting powers, duties, and limitations on 
public and private entities.”169 
 
While there have been legislative efforts to limit executive power, as noted in Part II, public 
health experts have recommended statutory amendments that would increase government 
accountability while also providing more a more sustainable response framework for future 
pandemics. A prime example of this is the Model State Public Health Emergency Act 
(MSPEHA).170 The Act was drafted in the wake of September 11th with an eye towards 
bioterrorism, but provisions of the Act have been adopted in over 33 states since 2003.171 In 2003, 
the Turning Point Model State Public Health Act (TPMSPHA) built on the original model act but 
expanded it to include a wider array of public health issues. While critics argue that the model does 
not adequately curb executive powers and the potential for civil liberties violations, others have 
pointed out that it is an important first step in creating nation-wide best practices in data collection 
and emergency response.172  
With lessons learned from the current pandemic, it may be time to reevaluate this model 
act with lessons learned from the specifics of a rapidly spreading novel virus. Some states have 
established task forces to study the impacts of COVID-19 emergency response to determine 
 
169 Scott Burris, Lindsay K. Cloud, and Matthew Penn, The Growing Field of Legal Epidemiology, J. OF PUB. 
HEALTH MGMT AND PRAC. (Mar. 1, 2020). 
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practical reforms for future pandemics, rather than relying solely on pushing legislation through.173 
The Uniform Law Commission also launched a committee in early 2020 to explore the 
effectiveness of a model or uniform public health emergency law that could provide guidelines for 
states that extend beyond the focus of the TPMSPHA.174 For example, just as many states have 
existing parameters around the use of quarantine and isolation, a uniform law could include 
“similarly specific authorizations and guardrails for compulsory measures to increase social 
distancing and use of personal protective equipment among the general public, regardless of 
known infection or exposure, during a declared public health emergency.”175 
Statutory intervention does not come without its problems, as states with partisan divides 
face barriers to pursuing proactive legislative responses. For example, following the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s nullification of the governor’s stay-at home-order, the Department of Health 
Services (DHS) submitted a modified order to the state legislature to take its place.176 The DHS is 
not authorized to independently issue its own order, and therefore relies on either executive orders 
or legislative rulemaking. However, the proposal was shortly withdrawn because the Republican-
controlled legislature refused to consider any state-wide mandates, with Governor Evers stating: 
“The Republicans made it very clear they don’t believe a statewide approach is the right way to 
go at this point in time, and they also don’t believe any restrictions are advisable at this time, so 
that kind of narrows it down…It just doesn’t make any sense to spend a lot of time doing something 
we know isn’t going to be successful.”177 
In order to overcome the politicization of future public health emergency, we need to look 
beyond just legislation. If COVID-19 has been shaped by the narrative that executive overreach 
during a crisis is inherently dangerous, then there is a need to shape institutions and narratives that 
will build trust. Instead of thinking about it in terms of “state police powers” and “overreach,” 
which can create fears of violation of individual liberties, there may be ways to frame emergency 
response as preparedness and prevention to avoid the need for such restrictive orders in the first 
place.  
 
B. Focusing on Preparedness and Prevention178 
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Experts note that drafting more emergency laws should not be the primary means for 
improving future responses to crisis or protecting public health.179  Preparedness includes building 
stronger institutions to provide programs and resources that mitigate the impact of restrictive 
public health response. The current response to COVID-19 has been reactionary and scattered due 
to lack of preparedness and weak social safety nets that could protect health, homes, and 
livelihoods. Without broader social safety nets, measures taken with the intent to protect certain 
communities can be construed as discriminatory treatment causing irreparable harm. Studies also 
show that people are more likely to comply with restrictive measures if they have proper social 
and economic support, creating incentives rather than restrictions relying on deterrence and 
punitive measures.180   
Prevention includes the development of strong communication strategies to improve 
transparency and build trust during an emergency. If a government is not able to communicate the 
rationale behind restrictive public health, there will most likely be public backlash over business 
closures, job loss, and infringement on personal freedoms. Lindsay Wiley, who has also cautioned 
against suspending judicial review during public health emergencies, has proposed five central 
principles that should guide preparedness and prevention and how they should be integrated into 
public health law reform.181 These include improving communications and transparency about the 
justification for mitigation efforts that show a “demonstrated threat of significant risk and a 
suitable fit between the means and clearly stated ends, [and] include statements of the strategic 
purpose orders are intended to serve, the scientific understanding on which they are based, and the 
criteria that will be relied on to determine whether they are working and when they can be 
lifted.”182  
Wiley also stresses the importance of social protection programs and incentives to 
compensate for losses that individuals and businesses may be forced to bear in the event of long-
term restrictions. This would not only address the inequitable and disparate impacts of a public 
health crisis,183 but would also discourage the need for individualized legal challenges to public 
health mandates. A recent Michigan case challenging a mandatory free testing requirement for 
workers living in onsite housing on farms and at food processing plants.184  Employers and a group 
of six farmworkers challenged the order, arguing that “migrant worker” was a proxy for Latino 
and should be subjected to strict scrutiny as a suspect class under the Fourteenth Amendment.185 
Plaintiffs argued that forced testing would prevent workers from earning wages if they test 
positive, and others would resign to avoid testing. The employers also challenged the 
administrative and economic burden of setting up testing infrastructure when other industries were 
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exempt from similar requirements. The Governor justified the order with studies showing the 
elevated risks of COVID transmission in worker camps and food processing facilities.186  
The Sixth Circuit denied the motion for preliminary injunction, citing a lack of 
discriminatory intent or invidious purpose, and found a legitimate public interest in upholding the 
order. “[I]f consideration of racial data were alone sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, then 
legislators and other policymakers would be required to blind themselves to the demographic 
realities of their jurisdictions and the potential demographic consequences of their decisions.”187 
Fear of lost wages and lost income triggered this legal challenge, rather than an aversion to the 
testing itself, which may not have been the case if states provided adequate compensation schemes 
and unemployment insurance for those impacted by restrictive measures. While prevention would 
not resolve all legal challenges, it might diminish the use of the court system for arbitrating 
personal economic grievances and allow the government to enact effective public health measures.  
Prevention may also include improving health care infrastructure and data collection to 
mitigate the impacts of public health measures when they do occur. Improving data and 
documentation practices would not only help inform prevention strategies but could also provide 
reliable evidence for states to use in their justification for public health mitigation efforts. In turn, 
this would help judges assess the scientific rationale behind an executive order and the implications 
of a particular policy for the broader public good. Traditionally, judges have relied heavily on CDC 
guidance and the scientific basis for public health restrictions to decide whether a particular 
measure sufficiently serves the state’s interest.188 However, this can be difficult with a novel 
disease like COVID-19 where reliable scientific data is not readily available and the CDC hesitated 
to issue recommendations that would negatively impact the economy.189 Many states also lacked 
the capacity to gather and publish real-time data on the virus.190 In part, this could have been 
prevented if states and healthcare institutions had the capacity to collect and disaggregate data, and 
if there were mechanisms in place for public health experts to share breakthroughs and compare 
findings in real time.  
Data would also allow for judges to use what some scholars call “rational medical basis” 
review, which would ensure that executive orders are assessed through the lens of specific 
incubation, transmission, and infection characteristics of a particular virus.191 For example, the 
Obama Administration implemented Ebola quarantine measures that were based on smallpox 
incubation, which resulted in restrictions that most likely did not serve the best interest of the state 
nor the isolated individuals.192 Yet due to Jacobson and absent an alternative, judges upheld the 
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quarantine measures in deference to state public health officials.193 The rational medical basis 
approach might allow courts to meaningfully review state action and prevent constitutional rights 
violations without substituting their own judgement for that of public health experts.  
 
C. Institutionalizing Public Health Decision-Making in Emergency Response 
Focusing on the balance of power between the executive and the legislature often does not 
account for other stakeholders involved in emergency response. Integrating public health experts 
and community members into decision-making should occur well-before an impending crisis. This 
expertise should also be grounded in reliable research that accounts for the unintended 
consequences and inequities stemming from some public health policies. 
There were attempts to institutionalize public health experts into decision-making 
processes early-on in the pandemic. 16 states established disparate impact or health equity task 
forces.194 Most of the task forces and study committees were convened by legislation or executive 
order and situated within the Governor’s office or public health department. Although most were 
comprised of state officials and public health experts, some states, including Massachusetts, 
Michigan, and Vermont, required that representatives reflected community diversity and those 
who worked in or experienced the disparate impacts of the healthcare system. Almost all the groups 
were tasked with analyzing or collecting disaggregated socio-economic and race data, and a few 
were asked for policy recommendations addressing social and economic vulnerabilities that are 
exacerbated by pandemic policy responses. 
However, these taskforces were ad hoc and lacked meaningful power, and many were 
disbanded after the first wave of executive orders. These efforts could be reinvigorated by 
initiatives to institutionalize administrative bodies that act independently in times of emergency. 
Proposals for these independent bodies argue that public trust and compliance might increase if 
public health measures were issued by a depoliticized agency led by experts and community 
members,195 and would reduce friction between the executive and legislative branches in making 
rapid decisions and wrestling for power during an emergency. This body would be:  
“strategically positioned to provide real-time credible advice to the executive and 
information to the public… It would replace a legislative delegation of emergency 
powers to the executive, which conflates the decision to declare an emergency with 
the decision to use emergency powers.”196 
Others have recommended an advisory committee that is responsible for declaring the end 
of a state of emergency, rather than relying on a governor to terminate their own executive order 
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or requiring a legislative joint resolution to overrule the governor.197 There have also been 
proposals to provide “statutory authorizations ex ante…[to] public health agencies and their 
leaders--not governors or mayors--to issue compulsory social distancing and face mask orders.”198 
While there may be some controversy about which type of policies could be delegated and under 
what conditions, identifying potential solutions prior to the start of another crisis would prevent 
elected officials and judges from having to make urgent  judgement calls during an emergency 
without any public health benchmarks.  
If states create committees or institutions to improve inclusive decision-making, these 
advisory bodies should take into account how pandemics disproportionately impact certain 
communities due to systemic racism and historic inequities in the public health system.199 One 
area of study that might be useful for mitigating disparate impacts is legal epidemiology which has 
been utilized in developing vaccination policies and regulating tobacco.200 Legal epidemiology 
looks at the intersection of law and public health policy, and takes into account social determinants 
of health to identify structural interventions that may unintentionally exacerbate inequities.201 For 
example, some states implemented “zones” that have dangerously high rates of infection, and then 
imposed restrictions based on zip codes. While this strategy may be narrowly tailored and 
grounded in data, these restrictions often disproportionately impact the mobility and financial 
security of communities of color. 
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